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PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS ASPECTS OF DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA EVICTION PROCEDURES
By Lynn E. Cunningham1
In nearly 50,000 cases per year the landlord and tenant court in the
District of Columbia provides summary adjudications of landlords’ rights to
possession of their property and resulting evictions of tenants. The thesis of this
article is that two aspects of court operations raise serious issues as to whether
the court unreasonably risks erroneous deprivation of a tenant's property, under
the rule of Connecticut v Doehr.2 First, the court's standard practice risks error
by of granting judgment to the landlord based solely on a half page complaint
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501 U.S. 1 (1991). That housing plays a major role in social
issues involving class, poverty, racial segregation, and family security is not to
be disputed. The property interests at stake in evictions actions both for
landlords and for tenants are considerable and undisputable. This article need
not take time to discuss these interests for the purposes of the Doehr analysis,
1

stating the landlord’s conclusory allegations, in a setting where most tenants
default or are pro se. Upon a tenant’s default, the court’s standard practice
compounds the risk of erroneous deprivation by entering what amounts to
summary judgment in most cases with no consideration of the validity of the
landlord's claim. In the rare case when the tenant comes to court with an
attorney, these due process issues attenuate.
Second, court rules prohibit the tenant from filing certain defenses and
counterclaims in response to the landlord’s complaint and thereby also give rise
to an unreasonably high risk of erroneous deprivation of the tenant’s property.
In some cases, the court permits a landlord to proceed fairly promptly to obtain
possession, while the tenant must proceed in another forum on a claim which if
adjudicated concurrently with the action for possession might forestall eviction.
Doehr sets up a three part test for due process compliance by court and
agency procedures where actions may result in the taking of property. The three
part test as stated in Doehr is:
... first, consideration of the private interest that will be affected by the
prejudgment measure;3 second, an examination of the risk of erroneous
deprivation through the procedures under attack and the probable value

since they are described at length elsewhere in the literature.
3

This first part of the test, the nature of the “private interest”, is
not really at issue here. Loss of one’s housing is essentially always a
sufficiently significant private interest so as to merit Due Process protection.
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Doehr, supra; Covey v. Sommers, 351
U.S. 141 (1956); Green v Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982); Frank Emmet Realty v
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of additional or alternative safeguards; and third... principal attention to
the interest of the party seeking the prejudgment remedy, with,
nonetheless, due regard for any ancillary interest the government may
have in providing the procedure or forgoing the added burden of
providing greater protections.4
Before examining the issues surrounding the risk of erroneous deprivation
resulting from the court procedures addressed in this article, the standard
procedure is set forth to clarify where and how a risk of erroneous deprivation
may arise in the D.C. L&T court setting.

Monroe, 562 A.2d 134 (1989).
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501 U.S. at 11.
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POINT I
D.C.’S FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER ACTIONS
Under Rule 1 of the D.C. Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure for
the Landlord and Tenant Branch (“L&T Rules”) the D.C. Superior Court
authorizes the establishment of a branch of the court for hearing actions for
possession pursuant to D.C.’s Forcible Entry and Detainer statute,5 D.C. Code
§16-1501 et seq., which provides as follows:
When a person detains possession of real property without right, or after
his right to possession has ceased, the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia, on complaint under oath verified by the person aggrieved by
the detention, or by his agent or attorney having knowledge of the facts,
may issue a summons in English and Spanish to the party complained of
to appear and show cause why judgment should not be given against him
for the restitution of possession.

Stated more plainly, the section gives the court the power to determine
whether one person has more "right" to possession of a piece of property than
another person, i.e., a "superior right to possession".6 The provision does not
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D.C. by statute also provides for ejectment actions, D.C. Code
§16-1101, but these are practically never
used.
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The statute is not phrased in terms of landlords and tenants, so as
to encompass, for example, actions by tenants seeking to evict their subtenants.
In other words, the provision does not deal with all the various laws and real
property case law that may determine what constitutes estates in land,
possession of real estate, and who may have a right to possess real estate that is
superior to that of another person.
4

address issues arising from how or when the right to possession ends perhaps in
part because other provisions address these issues and because the language of
the statute was crafted in an era when a landlord could evict a tenant without
giving any reason for doing so other than that the tenancy had expired. As a
number of commentators have shown,7 tenant rights have expanded greatly
during the past forty years, and a showing that the landlord has a “superior right
to possession” and that the tenant detains property “without right” can be
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complex indeed in D.C..8 For example, D.C. by statute limits the grounds for
evictions to nine, including non-payment of rent, serious and repeated breach of
the lease, commission of a crime on the premises, and the landlord’s desire to
occupy an apartment for himself. In addition, rent is controlled generally in
many private apartments, and strictly controlled in all public housing units, and
the accurate calculation of rent levels can be complex. Landlords are required
by D.C. law to warrant the habitability of their rental units9, and the existence of
severe violations within a dwelling of the housing code voids the lease
agreement entirely.10 Retaliatory evictions are prohibited.11 A tenancy does not
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A short background note may be helpful here to readers not
steeped in landlord and tenant court practice. Landlord and tenant law is not
derived from any single primary source. Aspects of real property law affecting
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English jurisprudence. Forcible Entry and Detainer state statutes were enacted
in many jurisdictions during the Nineteenth Century as a reform to protect
tenants from extra-judicial, self help eviction activities by landlords, activities
that could result in violence. Much of landlord and tenant court practice is
grounded in court-made common law. On the other hand, significant tenant
rights have been created since the late 1960s by federal and state legislatures
seeking to protect low income tenants against the harshest aspects of an ongoing
crisis in affordable housing for low and moderate income households. The
warranty of habitability, statutory controls on rents, good cause evictions, and
fair housing rights, are all rooted in actions by legislatures to protect tenants'
rights, without direct regard for the local housing court procedures that might
interact with those rights. Lindsey v. Normet came down at the end of a much
simpler– but hardly halcyon -- age, and at the dawn of the revolution in tenant
rights. It is hardly surprising therefore, that what seemed reasonable to the
Supreme Court in the Lindsey case seems hopelessly outdated today to most
tenant advocates.
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D.C. Municipal Reg. Title 14. Chapter 3.
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Brown v. Southall Realty, 237 A. 2d 834 (D.C. 1968).
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terminate when a lease expires, but essentially continues indefinitely unless the
tenant fails to pay the rent, or one of the other limited grounds for eviction
arises. Determining who has the “superior right to possession” within this
complex web of rights and responsibilities has not been a matter for simple
determination since the 1970s, when the Supreme Court issued its seminal
decision on eviction law, Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) , which upheld
the constitutionality of several aspects of Oregon’s summary eviction
procedures.
Under the section of the FED just quoted, to obtain a judgment for
possession, the landlord must plead to the court in a “complaint under oath
verified by the person...having knowledge of the facts” that the tenant “detains
possession...without right”. Judgment is to be entered on the basis of this
complaint alone since the proceedings are to be summary.12

However, the

tenant is entitled to come to court to “show cause why judgment should not be
given against him for ... possession”. The FED authorizes the court to enter
judgment based upon what is set forth in the complaint alone.13 No additional
motions practice is required. No motion for a preliminary injunction or motion
for summary judgment is contemplated by the FED. The court is to enter
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D.C. Code §3505.02 (2000 ed. All references herein to the D.C.
Code are to the 2001 edition.).
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Tutt v. Doby, 459 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir 1972).
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L&T Rule 11.
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judgment is based solely upon statements set forth in the complaint, unless the
tenant appears and asks for a trial on the claims.
Thus, the FED requires a considerably heightened standard of pleading
for the complaint beyond mere notice pleading. The landlord must set forth
under oath in the complaint itself why the detention is “without right”. From
the perspective of modern civil procedure, the FED effectively allows the court
to enter what might be termed summary judgment for the landlord based upon
the statements set forth in the complaint alone.
The FED provides that the tenant must, to avoid eviction, come to court
and, on the very first day of the proceeding “show cause” why the landlord has
failed to meet his burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that
the tenant remains in possession “without right”.
Before about 1970, this complaint/summary judgment procedure could
perhaps be considered reasonable where the facts and the law were simple: the
plaintiff identifies himself as the landlord, the defendant as the tenant, shows
that the tenancy has terminated, and judgment for possession should be entered
evicting the tenant. If the tenant shows up in court and shows that she did pay
the rent, or for some other reason the tenancy did not terminate, the court could
set the matter down for a prompt hearing. This general scenario passed due
process muster in 1972 according to the major Supreme Court decision that has
overshadowed considerations of Due Process in L&T courts ever since, Lindsey
v. Normet, supra.
8

The more modern scenario raises squarely the issue of, what must the
landlord set forth in the complaint to justify entry of judgment of possession
under the FED?
Think of Mrs. Brown in the seminal D.C. housing case of Brown v.
Southall Realty.14 Her apartment was in severely dilapidated condition when
she moved in and the landlord was aware of this condition. She refused to pay
rent after the first couple of months since her landlord, Southall Realty, refused
to bring her apartment up to the standard of the D.C. Housing Code. For
Southall Realty to claim that Ms. Brown held possession “without right” for
failure to pay rent, it would have to show that the unit was in compliance with
the D.C. Housing Code, and that the rent had been properly calculated. If the
landlord fails to show in the complaint that the dwelling is in compliance with
the housing code, he does not meet his burden of showing that the tenant is
holding “without right”. If the landlord alleges falsely that the unit is in
compliance, then there are other remedies that the court and the tenant has,
including primarily sanctions under Rule 11.
The Supreme Court has held on several occasions that the plaintiff’s
burden of pleading in the initial complaint is determined by the statute
authorizing the cause of action being pleaded.15 Accordingly, the FED requires
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Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980) ; Parratt v Taylor, 451
U.S. 527 (1981).
9

a plaintiff/landlord to plead more than merely that the tenant is “without right”,
but must demonstrate how under the facts and law applicable to the claim that
the court should reach this conclusion. Similar to FRCP Rule 56 requirements
for a valid motion for summary judgment for the landlord, the FED may fairly
be read to require the plaintiff to provide the court with both an affidavit made
under personal knowledge, and documents whose authenticity were
demonstrated to support at least the following:
1.

The name of the landlord and the relationship of the landlord to
the building and the apartment in question, presumably an
ownership or other fee relationship superior to that of the tenant.

2.

The terms under which the defendant holds or held a tenancy,
and the correct name of the tenant.

3.

Any lease terms relevant to the claim.

4.

Facts demonstrating a breach of the lease such that the right to
possession has ceased. In a non-payment case, the landlord
should set forth under oath the contents of his rent records
documenting the tenant’s failure to pay rent for one or more
months.

5.

How the rent was calculated, if the building was rent controlled.

6.

In a non-payment case, whether or not the tenant rent was fully
or partially abated as a result of the landlord’s violation of the
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statutory warranty of habitability.16
The landlord, or one its agents having knowledge of the "facts" must
make a showing in a “complaint” that the tenant's right to possession has ended.
If Southall Realty pleads all this in the complaint, then, according to the
FED, the tenant must come forward at the return date hearing and "show cause"
why judgment should not be entered against her. The tenant might show that she
had in fact paid all the rent due or that the dwelling was operated in violation of
the Housing Code beyond what the landlord had alleged and all rent should be
abated. In other words, the landlord's complaint sets up a decision for the court
to make, at a hearing on the "return date", which under the FED, is to be the
only hearing on the case, unless the parties and the court determine otherwise.
The tenant must, according to this FED provision, come forward at the return
date and controvert those facts pleaded and proven in the complaint in order to
head the court off from entering the judgment for possession on that day. The
tenant technically under the FED statute can have as little as seven days to come
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Title 14 D.C.M.R. Chapter 3. That the landlord’sburden of
pleading includes compliance with the housing code would be a controversial
point in the view of the landlords’ bar. Advocates for landlords would contend
that under D.C. law Javins characterizes the landlord’s violation of the warranty
of habitability as a counterclaim of the tenant and as a defense and hence the
burden of pleading is on the tenant. The response is that the landlord cannot
seriously contend that the tenant holds without right if the landlord has provided
a unit that is seriously out of compliance with the housing code standards,
leaving no rent due.
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to court to do this on the "return date",17 although in practice in D.C. the court
clerks provide landlords about twenty days between the issuance of a summons
by the clerk’s office and the date approved for the return18.
Perhaps the heightened pleading standard required by the FED in the
complaint can be shown more clearly in an example other non-payment of rent.
One of the nine grounds for evicting a tenant to which landlords are limited in
D.C., as set forth in 42 D.C. Code §42-3505.01, is when the landlord desires to
demolish the building in which the apartment is located and “replac[e] it with
new construction”.19 Prior to having a cause of action for possession under the
FED on this ground, the landlord must
1.

Prepare a demolition plan for the building.

17

D.C. Code §16-1502. Provides a return date of seven days
(excluding Sundays and legal holidays) of the service of the summons and
complaint.
18

Tenant defendants will not have the full twenty days, however,
since they might not always be served with the summons and complaint until a
few days prior to the return date.
19

“(f) A housing provider may recover possession of a rental unit
for the purpose of immediately demolishing the housing accommodation in
which the rental unit is located and replacing it with new construction, if a copy
of the demolition permit has been filed with the Rent Administrator, and, if the
requirements of subchapter VII of this chapter have been met. The housing
provider shall serve on the tenant a 180-day notice to vacate in advance of
action to recover possession of the rental unit. The notice to vacate shall comply
with and notify the tenant of the tenant's right to relocation assistance under the
provisions of subchapter VII of this chapter.
(2) Tenants displaced by actions under this subsection shall be entitled to
receive relocation assistance as set forth in subchapter VII of this chapter, if the
tenants meet the eligibility criteria of that subchapter.”
12

2.

Obtain a permit for the demolition.

3.

File the permit with the Rent Administrator.

4.

Comply with the requirements to offer the building for sale to the
tenant before obtaining the demolition permit.

5.

Serve the tenant with a 180 day notice to quit and allow the
notice to expire.

6.

Notify the tenant of his right to relocation assistance.

The tenant may not be fairly characterized to be holding possession of
the unit “without right” until these steps have been taken, documented by the
landlord. The “elements” of a cause of action for possession under this
provision would include full proof at a minimum of all these items. Were the
landlord, for example, to file a claim for possession without obtaining the
required demolition permit, the claim would be fairly held characterized by a
court to be insufficient, since the tenant could not be properly characterized in
the complaint as holding the property “without right”.
In other words, the FED statue requires the landlord to plead and prove
in the complaint more than mere conclusory allegations that the plaintiff is the
landlord, or that the tenant is the defendant, and that the landlord will be
prepared to prove at a trial at some later date in the proceedings that the tenant
is "detaining possession without right." A fair reading of the way the FED
statute is written is that, the law and facts spelling out why the tenant lacks the
right to possession must be proven in the initial pleading itself, by a statement
13

under oath by a person having knowledge of the relevant facts.
In fact, the actual form complaint required by the court rules does not
call for this level of pleading, as discussed in the next section.
As stated, L&T Rule 1 authorizes the creation of the L&T Branch of
D.C. Superior Court for the adjudication of FED claims. The Branch has
evolved in the past 100 years or more to adjudicating annually tens of thousands
of actions for possession based on the FED. By the 1970's there were well over
100,000 filings. Currently, the number has dropped to just under 50,000 per
year. Eighty percent of cases are for non-payment of rent, the rest based on
other grounds for eviction, such as other breaches of the lease.
Less than one percent of defendants appear by an attorney. Defendants
in L&T court tend to be poorly educated, low income, and the number for
attorneys available through free legal services programs is minuscule compared
to the number of tenants needing representation.20 The sources of law
governing this area are varied and complex, involving multiple statutes, and
extensive case law: there is no one, readily accessible source of law for tenants
to use for help in appearing making a pro se appearance.
A large percentage of complaint filings result in a default judgment
against the tenant. Most defaults are entered without the court requiring any ex
parte proof of the landlord’s case, similar to the requirements of Federal Rule
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Lynn Cunningham, Legal Needs for the Low Income Population
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55, because the court has effectively for years followed the command of the
FED and treated the landlord’s complaint as all that is needed for the entry of
judgment against the tenant. Administrative changes by the court at the time
this article was completed may put in place steps to require ex parte proof prior
to the entry of judgment by default in some categories of cases, but it has not
done so yet, and it is not planning to do so in most cases.
Thus, the complaint filed by the landlord is the sole ground upon which
the court adjudicates the landlord’s claim for possession.
Most tenants who do appear in court are shepherded by court clerks and
procedures to enter into a consent decree following brief “negotiations” with the
landlord’s attorney. Without an attorney of her own to advise her, and without
complete written or oral guidance about what the law is governing her case, the
tenant is left to negotiate in the foyer of the courtroom with an experienced
attorney who specializes in this area of the law and who makes a living from his
or her extensive knowledge of the landlord and tenant practice and procedures.
The tenant’s primary source of information about the landlord’s claims is the
written complaint in her case.
Thus, again, the nature and quality of the landlord’s initial filing, i.e., the
complaint alone, provides the sole basis for the court’s entry of judgment for the
landlord, and normally the sole source of information to the tenant about the
nature of the landlord’s claims.

REVIEW, No. 1, 21, Fall, 2000.
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NOTICE PLEADING STANDARD FOR CIVIL COMPLAINTS
The familiar standard for what constitutes an acceptable complaint under
the federal rules of civil procedure, and under the parallel D.C. regular civil
procedure rules as well, is “notice pleading”, a much lower standard than the
heightened pleading seemingly required by the FED. FRCP Rule 8 requires a
“short and plain statement” of the court’s jurisdiction, and a “short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and a
demand for relief. If the federal complaint pleader leaves out an important
allegation, or makes allegations that are too vague for the defendant to
understand, the defendant may move to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b),
or make a motion for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e). If the pleader
or his attorney alleges facts which cannot be substantiated, or omits any legal
basis for his claim, or alleges legal theories that are worthless, the court may
issue sanctions under Rule 11. Complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs are given
generous interpretations by courts, out of an understanding that lay persons
cannot be expected to follow the sophisticated niceties of pleading expected of
members of the bar.21
Judgment is not entered on the basis of the complaint alone, since the
role of the complaint is to inform the defendants of the claims pending, and to
lay a basis for pre-trial discovery and preparation for trial. The court will enter
judgment only on the basis of default by the defendant, a motion for summary
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judgment under Rule 56, or after a trial. How the regular civil rules handle
judgment by default is particularly relevant here, since, as stated, most L&T
judgments in D.C. are entered by default. Under Rule 55 (a), the court clerk
enters a “default” when the defendant fails to answer or otherwise respond to
the complaint, but then the plaintiff must apply to the court for a judgment by
default, unless the claim is for a “sum certain”. The court then normally holds
an ex parte hearing to examine the plaintiff’s legal claims, and the bases for its
factual allegations.22
By contrast, the L&T Court requires plaintiffs to use a form complaint
that at least arguably falls well short of even the notice pleading standard for
certain types of claims, and then enters judgment based solely on the complaint,
with no ex parte proof required of the landlord..23 Before examining whether
this procedure comports with due process, the L&T Court Form complaint will
be reviewed in more detail.

21
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See, e.g., Castro v. U.S., – U.S. – , 124 S. Ct. 786 (2003).
Cf., D.C. Superior Court Rule 55-II.
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L&T Rule 11. (“...the Clerk shall enter judgment for the plaintiff
as demanded in the complaint, if the plaintiff is present... and the defendant is
[not] present...”). L&T Rule 14(a)(1). (A judgment for possession may be
entered: (1) by the Clerk in favor of the plaintiff if the defendant fails to appear
at the 9:00 a.m. roll call.”). As of this writing the L&T Court rules committee is
considering modifications that will require ex parte proof when the tenant has
previously appeared in the action, and certain other categories of cases.
Conversation with Eric Angel, Esq. D.C. Legal Aid Society, July 6, 2004,
17

D.C.’s FED Complaint.
While the FED statute seemingly provides for a show cause proceeding
based on a quite specific factual showing under a seriously heightened pleading
standard by the plaintiff/landlord in order to set up a proceeding that results in a
judgment on the return date for the landlord, the D.C. Superior Court focuses its
procedure on the possibility of entering the judgment on the return date aspect
of the FED, while precluding compliance with the heightened pleading standard
otherwise required by the FED. These rules mandate that all plaintiffs filing in
the court must use a simple one-half page complaint on letter size paper. A copy
is provided as an attachment to this article. L&T Rule 3 requires the use of the
L&T Form 1.24 No other form may be used. The same page that contains the
complaint also contains the summons. A line by line review of Form 1 reveals a
series of choices for the landlord to check off, written in the most telegraphic
language.
The caption of the form requires the pleader to enter a name above a line
labeled “Plaintiff/Landlord.” A second line is labeled “Defendant/Tenant.”
Addresses of each are required.
After the caption, and a title for the pleading, and an affidavit identifier,
a blank line invites the plaintiff/pleader again to give a name, and then offers

Washington, D.C.
24

See, Form 1, attached hereto. There is no statutory basis as such
for the use of Form 1. (L&T Rule 3 provides: “A Landlord and Tenant action
shall be commenced by delivering to the clerk a complaint, verification, and
18

three choices for checking off so that the pleader can indicate whether he is the
landlord, a licensed real estate broker, or the landlord's agent: "( ) the landlord
and/or ( ) licensed real estate broker or ( ) the landlord's authorized agent of the
house, apartment or office located at ........................., Washington, D.C." The
form does not meet the FED requirement that the person filling out the
complaint show that he has "knowledge of the facts", and there is no such
statement or showing on the complaint to this effect, although such knowledge
might be inferred if the pleader is the landlord himself.
The form does not require the plaintiff to show what in any clear detail
the relationship he or she has to the landlord and how he is authorized to file
this action, if the pleader is not the landlord. Form 1's failure to require the
plaintiff (other than the landlord) to prove up who he is and that he is authorized
to bring the FED action by an appropriate party has implications both for failing
to inform the defendant of these allegations, and for the court's jurisdiction to
hear the matter, i.e., the issue of how the plaintiff has standing to bring an action
is ignored. Although the Superior Court is an Article I court under the
Constitution (DC is a federal entity, not a state entity), the DC Court of Appeals
has held repeatedly that parties bringing actions in the court must show that they
have standing to bring the action filed as if the court were an Article III court.25
The Form 1 complaint, unless it is filed by the landlord himself who identifies

prepared summons, in the form prescribed in Landlord and Tenant Form 1....”).
25

E.g., Friends of Tilden Park, Inc v District of Columbia and
19

himself as such, normally fails to show that the party bringing the action has
standing to bring it. There is no space or provision on the form for the plaintiff
who is not actually the landlord to do so. It is hard to imagine a plaintiff who
filed a conventional civil action getting away with simply identifying himself as
"plaintiff" without making some clear showing as to what stake he had in case
or controversy brought before the court in his case. For example, the complaint
allows a licensed real estate broker to file as a plaintiff, but there is no clear
showing in Form 1 concerning for whom the broker is acting or why the broker
might enjoy standing to file an action on his own.26 Moreover, while tenants are
permitted to file actions to evict their subtenants, there is no wording on the
form complaint that covers tenants suing subtenants. Instead, a tenant-plaintiff
would have to list himself as the landlord/plaintiff.
No allegation is made about the plaintiff having a "superior right to
possession" to that of the defendant that is the basis of the FED claim. At best,
the "superior right to possession" is implied, based on the person claiming to be
the landlord checking the "landlord" box, and the later portion of Form 1 stating
that the tenant is in possession “without right”. The Form does not state that the
defendant's "right to possession has ceased", as the FED statute requires, nor

Clark Realty Capital, 806 A.2d 1201 (D.C. 2002).
26

The form provides an option for the agent to check off that he or
she is the “landlord’s” agent, but this then begs the question of who the landlord
is.
20

does it reference the nine carefully defined legal bases for eviction.27 The
complaint arguably fails in any clear way to set up, argue, or establish the
fundamental element of the cause of action authorized by the FED statute,
namely, "superior right to possession", as illustrated above.
Form 1 provides the plaintiff with a series of options which are intended
to be different, possible causes of action in the form: choice A is non-payment
of rent; choice B is "tenant failed to vacate after a notice to quit has expired"
and finally, choice C, "for the following reason (explain fully)". Each choice
presents its own problems in terms of accurately reflecting the current state of
landlord and tenant law in D.C. and providing the tenant defendant with some
notice about the claims raised against her and to the court about the basis for the
judgments it is entering.
Choice A, regarding non-payment of rent exhibits, or, more accurately,
conceals, several problems, although it is the simplest. As stated, Choice A fails
to state what the lawful rent is or how it is calculated, but instead limits the
allegation simply to how much back rent is allegedly owed. When the early
FED statutes were first enacted in the mid-nineteenth century, there was no rent
control in D.C. and such a bare allegation of unpaid rent might have been
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Grounds for eviction are set forth in D.C. Code 42- 3505.01.
Examples include: violation of an obligation of the tenancy coupled with failure
to correct the violation after being warned to do so; performing an illegal act in
the unit; the landlord needs to use the apartment for himself; the landlord needs
to renovate the unit; and the landlord plans to demolish the unit.
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sufficient.28 Choice A, provides neither the tenant nor the court with notice
about what methodology was used to calculate the rent sued for and the issue of
the accuracy of the rent calculation is ignored. Moreover, choice A fails to
show the tenant or the court that the landlord has any factual basis for a claim,
such as records from a rent receipts accounting mechanism. To add confusion,
other non-rental “fees” of unspecified origin may be added into the rent line.
While D.C. case law is fairly clear (to practicing attorneys) about what fees can
and cannot be sued for, choice A makes no provision for the plaintiff to show
clearly how it made a choice about which fees to include and in what amounts.
Defendants are put on notice that there is some issue about rent and/or fees, but
not provided with a basis for preparing for trial on the return date on these
issues. The essential factual predicates for showing that the tenant is holding
the premises “without right” cannot be shown in the form complaint.
Choice B on Form 1 purports to set forth a claim that is based on the
tenant's failure to vacate the premises following expiration of a valid notice to
quit, and requires the plaintiff to attach a copy of the notice to quit. This would
be the choice for the demolition example given above. Unlike the rest of the
complaint, and in contravention to the requirement of the FED statute, the

28

In D.C. a tenant may be evicted for failure to pay even minor
amounts of back rent. However, equity of redemption doctrine requires the
court to state the amount of rent which the tenant must pay in order to exercise
redemption. Translux Radio City Corp. v Service Parking Corp., 54 A.2d 144
(D.C. Mun. App. 1947). On the other hand, the landlord could simply sue for a
set amount in the eviction action, and worry about collecting any balance due in
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contents of the notice do not need to be "verified under oath" by someone with a
knowledge of the facts.29 The complaint does not require the plaintiff to show
when or how the notice to quit was served on the tenant, although some notices
may show this.
The third choice is "C": "For the following reason: (explain fully)", with
one and a half lines available for the explanation. A more reasonable
‘explanation’ such as, "because the lease has expired" might survive review by
the initial filing clerk at the courthouse. Yet under D.C. law, expiration of a
residential lease is not a ground for termination of a tenancy, except in a few
certain well defined circumstances.30 A judge with knowledge of real estate law
in D.C. might refuse to enter judgement by default against the tenant on this
ground, except that judges do not review most complaints prior to entry of
default judgement, as discussed.
L&T form complaints in D.C. arguably do not even meet notice pleading
requirements of FRCP Rule 8. Most defendants represented by attorneys in
more common civil cases would respond to the L&T form complaint with a
motion for a more definite statement, or to dismiss.
In short, the current form complaint procedures fail to comport with the
D.C. FED statute. The D.C. FED procedures are problematic just within the

a later civil action.
29

D.C. Code § 42-3505.01.

30

D.C. Code §§ 42-3503.01 et. seq.
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local statutory framework. No reasonable judge in a regular civil case would
grant judgment simply on the basis of the statements that landlords or their
agents and attorneys are constrained to provide on these lines. A motion for
summary judgment under Rule 56 in a civil case on this kind of record would be
normally be denied.
The Form 1 complaint appears to fail to meet the requirements of the
FED statue which the court rules requiring it purport to implement. Does the
complaint form alone, or in combination with entry of default judgment,
comport with the requirements of due process?
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POINT II
DUE PROCESS AND COMMENCEMENT OF FED ACTIONS
FED procedures have faced court challenges in other jurisdictions in the
past for failing to meet due process standards. The most notable challenge, now
over 30 years old, was based on the ground that Oregon state FED statutes
which provided for a short turn around with which such "summary" cases were
brought to issue, was unfair because a defendant had insufficient time to prepare
a defense for the hearing.31 A second challenge in the same lawsuit was
grounded on limitations imposed on what defenses and counterclaims
tenant/defendants could raise, thus impairing the ability to protect their interests
fairly in the action for possession, even though they could raise these defenses
and claims in separate lawsuits.32 The Supreme Court rejected both challenges
and found that the FED procedures from Oregon withstood due process
scrutiny. No claim was made that the Oregon form complaint by itself was
invalid. Since it came down in 1972, the holding of Lindsey has overshadowed
general perceptions about the overall constitutionality of FED procedures in
general.33

31

Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).

32

Ibid. In the same decision, the Court held that a requirement that
the tenant post a bond pending an appeal violated due process.
33

A third challenge to widely used FED procedure which did
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This article challenges that shadow. Over thirty years of development in
landlord and tenant law and in the Supreme Court's own analysis of what courts
must provide to comply with due process, strongly suggest that Lindsey is no
longer good law today. The famous statement in Lindsey, that the "Constitution
has not federalized the substantive law of landlord and tenant relations," is
usually taken to mean that FED procedures are simply not susceptible to further
constitutional attack, and must be left for reform to the tender mercies of state
and local legislatures and local court committees which are normally dominated
by the landlord/plaintiffs’ bar.
A return to the fundamentals of modern due process doctrine guides the
next stage of this analysis.

THE MATTHEWS/DOEHR TEST.
Mathews v. Eldridge34 sets forth a ‘now familiar’ three part test for
determining what procedures need be supplied to comport with due process
before a party may be deprived of a property interest by a governmental entity.
Mathews concerned a federal agency's deprivation of disability benefits from a

succeed, addressed the then normal practice of serving the summons and
complaint on the tenant by simply posting them on the door of the apartment.
This practice was held to be insufficient notice, and mailing by certified mail
was held to be required to supplement notice by posting. Greene v. Lindsey,
456 U.S. 444 (1982).
34

424 U.S. 319 (1976)
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private citizen through federal agency administrative procedures.35 In
Connecticut v. Doehr,36 the Court applied the Mathews test and addressed the
issue of what procedures were required to afford due process before a private
party plaintiff could obtain a civil court attachment on another private party's
house. In other words, although the Court in Doehr did not discuss or address
its holding in Lindsey, it has laid out a three part test, quite similar to the
Mathews test, for the due process standards with which a state civil courts, and
by implication, L&T courts, must comply.
In Doehr the Supreme Court rejected Connecticut state court procedure
that allowed the plaintiff to impose a pre-judgment attachment on the
defendant's house based simply on an affidavit stating that plaintiff believed in
good faith he was entitled to judgment on his claims and that he had been
harmed by the defendant.37 The Connecticut court procedure provided no
notice to the defendant in advance of the attachment paper which was issued by
the state court clerk's office itself upon ex parte application by the plaintiff. The
Court found that, particularly in a case involving a tort claim arising from a
fistfight, where the facts could easily be in dispute, such an ex parte,
prejudgment attachment was outside the bounds of what due process permits
because the risk of erroneous deprivation of defendant’s property was

35

Id.

36

501 U.S. 1(1991).
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unreasonably high within the context of those procedures.38 Specifically, the
Court held that the risk of erroneous deprivation was too serious where the
attachment is based merely on the plaintiff's belief that his complaint has merit,
and, of course, the plaintiff might be wrong in that belief.

THE INTERESTS AT STAKE IN AN FED PROCEEDING.
Vital interests of the housing provider and of the tenant highlight the
importance of avoiding erroneous deprivation of either. The first and third
elements of the Doehr analysis call upon the reviewing court to consider the
interests of each side in the controversy. As stated above, the seriousness of the
interests of the landlords’ and tenants’ in the dwelling units in dispute is
sufficiently clear that these issues need not be reexamined here.
The Lindsey Court approached its analysis by assuming that all parties
knew what was going on when the landlord seeks possession, and, so, FED
procedures could be simple, quick, and one side’s issues segregated from the
others in order to determine the issue of possession promptly.39 These seem
unlikely in light of D.C. complex law governing evictions.
The sufficiency of notice is the key issue to be examined here.

37

501 U.S. at 11.

38

501 U.S. at 14

39

405 U.S. at 65 (“ Tenants would appear to have as much
access to relevant facts as their landlord....”).
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SUFFICIENCY OF NOTICE IN D.C. FED ACTIONS
The risk of erroneous deprivation of defendant’s property can be
unreasonably high if the defendant is not adequately informed of the
proceedings that may result in the seizure of his property. Moreover, the notice
aspect of Due Process doctrine is sufficiently significant to have merited its own
line of cases.
The mantra recited in a multiplicity of cases involving the notice aspect
of due process40 comes from Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of
the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections.41

As discussed in Point I above, D.C. evictions are commenced by the
service on the tenant-defendant of the one half page Form 1 complaint. Does
this extremely cursory form provide the tenant with adequate notice under Due
Process requirements, putting aside the Form’s apparent lack of compliance
with the FED provisions? Is notice to the court of the content of the complaint
sufficient for entry of default and consent judgments against tenants?
The form complaint contravenes several aspects of due process doctrine

40

Due Process requirements unquestionably apply to FED
proceedings. Green v Lindsey, supra; Lindsey v Normet, supra; Frank Emmet
Realty v Monroe, supra; Richmond Tenants Org v. Kemp, 956 F.2d 1300 (4th
Cir. 1991)
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pertaining to adequate notice.

Lack of Any Notice to Defendant.

41

339 U.S. at 314.
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First, in many situations the form complaint fails to provide defendants with any notice at
all. Erroneous deprivation can arise from a complete lack of any notice to a defendant,42 since
Due Process requires that notice of some kind must be provided to the defendant.43 The form
complaint’s fails to require the landlord to provide the tenant with any of several items: notice of
the statutory or case law basis of the landlord’s claim;44 the identity and standing of the plaintiff;
the jurisdictional basis of the court over the claim alleged; and, when and how the lease/contract
was breached. No place for statutory citation is provided in the form, nor is it required in the
notice to quit which must be attached to the complaint in notice cases. The other items are not
addressed in the form complaint. On the one hand, the tenant may be left guessing and confused
about, for example, what are the legal bases, if any, for the claims against her, and hence not
understand how or whether to respond to the notice. On the other hand, the L&T court enters
judgments by default as a matter of standard practice without ever determining whether the

42

Richmond Tenants Org v Kemp, 956 F.2d at 1308. (public housing tenants whose
homes were seized under a federally sponsored “asset forfeiture” project intended to rid properties
of unlawful drugs successfully challenged the seizure of their homes because the seizures
occurred without any prior notice to the tenants).
43

Naturally efforts must be taken so that written notice of the proceedings must
reasonably be calculated to reach defendant physically. Mullane itself addressed this issue. 339
U.S. at 314. In 1982 the Supreme Court applied Mullane explicitly to require enhanced efforts to
achieve service of process in eviction actions. Green v Lindsey, supra. In 1988, the D.C. Court of
Appeals required the landlord to take reasonable steps to serve process on a tenant whom the
landlord knew was residing in Colorado. Frank Emmet Realty v. Monroe, supra. This does not
mean that in every case, notice must be guaranteed in fact to reach the defendant, but that
reasonable efforts under all circumstances will be made to see that written notice reaches the
defendant. See also, Joint Anti-fascist Refugee Committee V. Mcgrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
44

Phillips Petroleum Co. v Shutts, et al, 472 U.S. 797 (1985). Richmond Tenants
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landlord/plaintiff has a legal basis for its claim or the other elements just named.45 While it is true
that the Form 1 complaint and summons by itself is likely to be sufficient to inform a tenant at a
minimum of the actual pendency of an FED action, notice to the defending party must provide
more than that there is a hearing concerning something affecting the defendant’s property.46 In
other words, even though procedures may be available under SCR Rules 11 and 12(b)(6) and 12
(e) for an FED defendant represented by an attorney to move a court to test the validity of the
claims alleged in the form complaint, the court through a defective form has all but forbidden the
landlord/plaintiff from informing the tenant-defendants prior to the hearing to be held on the
return date allowed by the FED about significant aspects of the claims raised against her.
In sum, the form complaint fails to provide any notice whatsoever of significant portions
of the landlord’s claims.
Informing Defendant of the Nature of the Claims Made
Second, courts have held in a variety of settings and in a variety of ways that the
erroneous risk standard requires that the defendant be informed of the nature of claims affecting

Org. v. Kemp, 956 F.2d 1300 (4th Cir. 1992).
45

Final Report of the D.C. Bar Public Services Activities Corporation Landlord and
Tenant Task Force, August, 1998. Unpublished. Copy in the possession of the author. (“L&T
Task Force Report”)
46

See e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division et al. v. Craft et al, 436 U.S. 1
(1978); City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234 (1999). Moreover, the language of the
summons and complaint gives no notice about whether the tenant may raise any defenses or
counterclaims to the eviction claims. A governmental entity is not required to explain to an
affected party what procedures are available for that party to protect or recover her property, so
long as the sources of the law are available to the party receiving the notice. The tenant has no
means of determining what sources of law the landlord is relying on to support his or her claim
and no means of determining the process for raising defenses or counterclaims.
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their interests in order to allow them to decide how and when to take action to protect those
interests, including appearing at a hearing. 47

Form 1does not permit the landlord to inform the

court or the tenant of the nature of the claims against her and allow her to prepare for the return
date hearing, and thereby significantly increases the risk of erroneous deprivation of the tenant's
interests. Many tenants simply default, since they are not informed about the claims against them
and are thereby left confused about how to respond.48
If the tenant actually shows up in court on the return date, risk of erroneous deprivation
imposed by the defective form complaint can be either exacerbated or attenuated, depending on
what happens on that first “return” day. The tenant might obtain an attorney, and the problems
with the initial notice are vitiated through the usual court processes for testing the validity of the
pleadings, i.e., discovery and pre-trial preparation. But in the vast majority of cases the tenant is

47

Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (notice to absent class members
must describe the action and the plaintiffs’ rights in it); Hamby v. Neel, 368 F.3d 549 (6th Cir.
2004) (misleading information on application form for Tenncare violated notice requirement of
Due Process); Christopher v. Ken Davis Holding Co., 249 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 2001); Cuffee v.
Sullivan, 842 F.Supp. 1219 (D.Mo. 1993)(notice must be of such a nature as reasonably to convey
the required information); Graham v. Barnhart, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16958 (D.Kan. 2002); ;
Sullivan v. Barnett, 139 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 1998); Cooper v. Makela, 629 F.Supp 658 (D.N.Y.
1986); Otto v. Texas Tamale Co., 219 B.R. 732 (Bankr. D.Tex. 1998); Farmer v Admin. Dir. Of
the Court, State of Hawaii, 94 Haw. 232 (2000). One court cited to a requirement that notice must
inform parties of "what is occurring". Ibid, at 739. Another holding required that the plaintiff
inform defendant of his right to present evidence at the hearing, Harlan Bell Coal v. Lamar, 904
F.2d 1042 (6th Cir. 1990) and another of the duty of the plaintiff to inform defendants of their
right to present objections at the hearing. Kephart v Apfel, 45 Fed. Appx. 606, 2002 US App.
LEXIS 17253 (9th Cir. 2002).
48

Mullane makes this point about the party being notified having to make a decision
about whether to respond or not, as well. 339U. S. at 314 (“This right to be heard has little reality
or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to
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effectively shepherded by the court clerks out into a lobby area for a one on one meeting with the
attorney for the landlord, to work out a “settlement”. Tenants have only the complaint as notice
of the claims against them and no means to judge the validity of those claims and make a decision
about whether and how to enter into a compromise with those claims. The form complaint, in
bare notice pleading fashion, simply tells the tenant that there is some kind of a claim pending, bu
not the details of the claim. Normally the tenant simply agrees to sign a consent judgment and
agrees to move out of the premises within a few weeks, or agrees to pay the unabated back rent on
top of current rent, even if the tenant may have substantial defenses.49 If a tenant were informed
of the precise details of the claim, she could have a better chance to think through and present
what her objections to the claim might be.
The failure of the form complaint to inform the defendant of the claims made leaves the
defendant guessing about how to respond to the claims, while the landlord’s attorney is
advantaged with knowing exactly what he or she is seeking from the court.
Timeliness of the Required Response Affects the Risk
A third aspect of adequacy of notice is its timeliness. Under the Mathews/Doehr calculus,
what is a reasonable time to respond would depend on the variety of factors involved in the
normally applicable procedures.50 The FED statutory rule of one seven-day-size fits all, based on

appear or default, acquiesce or contest.”)
49

This settlement negotiation process enjoys a very poor reputation among tenant
attorneys in D.C. Conversation with Jonathan Smith, D.C. Legal Aid Society, July 6, 2004. See
also, L&T Task Force Report, supra, footnote 42.
50

Numerous courts have held that notice must provide a “reasonable time” for
parties to prepare their defenses and enter an appearance. Christopher v. Ken Davis Holding Co.,
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the pre-Javins legal system, arguably will not withstand scrutiny when the claims raised by the
landlord and the defenses and counterclaims available to the tenant, are derived from now
complex areas of the law. While the Lindsey Court rejected a claim challenging this time frame
argument against the backdrop of early, greatly simplified housing law in effect in that era, the
short time frame for the tenant to appear in court for a final hearing in response to the form
complaint gives rise to a serious risk of erroneous deprivation when there is a complex of
substantial defenses and counterclaims which tenants in D.C. may now raise. Short circuiting the
time to prepare for court will usually lead the tenant to be unable to prepare, and again, an
unreasonable and unnecessary risk of erroneous deprivation arises. Current Due Process doctrine
does not likely countenance the short time frame for notice provided under a literal reading of the
FED and the Form 1 complaint. Even currently, in those cases where the tenant is represented
and has filed an answer with counterclaims, the court does not require trial within seven days, out
of recognition that even experienced attorneys will need many days to begin to prepare a defense,
research the many sources of applicable law, identify witnesses, and review documents from the
landlord. More like a year is the time line leading up to a full jury trial, following pre-trial
discovery. Presumably with a shorter time frame, an unusually detailed and explicit complaint
would be required, setting forth the factual basis for the landlord’s claim and the law underlying
it. The form complaint does not provide such detailed notice and, hence, would likely not pass
muster for lack of timeliness.

249 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. McCall, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 18507(6th Cir. 1999);
Laconia Savings Bank v. U.S., 116 F. Supp. 2d 248 (D.N.H. 2000)(three weeks publication notice
in forfeiture proceeding); Miles v. D.C., 354 F.Supp. 577 (D.D.C. 1973);; Cooper v. Makela, 629
F.Supp 658 (D.N.Y. 1986); Otto v. Texas Tamale Co., 219 B.R. 732 (Bankr. D.Tex. 1998).
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DEFAULTS BASED ON A BARE COMPLAINT MIRROR ATTACHMENTS BASED ON THE
BARE AFFIDAVITS IN DOEHR.

Doehr rejected the taking of property, even preliminarily, where plaintiff’s allegations
were not subjected to testing by any court procedures. Here, the numerous default judgments
based on the landlord’s sworn complaint obtained in D.C. L&T court are strikingly similar to the
taking of real property based on the pre-trial procedure of a mere filing of a conclusory affidavit
by the plaintiffs and rejected by Doehr.51 No judge ever tests the validity of plaintiffs allegations
of fact and law prior to the entry of a many L&T judgments. As noted above, defaults in regular
civil proceedings generally must be followed by an ex parte proof hearing before a judgment may
be entered under Superior Court Rule 55, unless the claim is for a sum certain. The lack of ex
parte proof following entry of judgment in a complex L&T case arguably resembles the similar
procedures rejected in Doehr. A default judgement is clearly viewed differently under Due
Process scrutiny than a pre-judgment attachment, since, by defaulting the defendant has impliedly
consented to the allegations in the complaint.52 Nonetheless, the lack of any testing of the
plaintiffs allegations by the court seriously risks the erroneous taking of property.

51

“Permitting a court to authorize attachment merely because the plaintiff believes
the defendant is liable, or because the plaintiff can make out a facially valid complaint, would
permit the deprivation of the defendant's property when the claim would fail to convince a jury,
when it rested on factual allegations that were sufficient to state a cause of action but which the
defendant would dispute, or in the case of a mere good-faith standard, even when the complaint
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The potential for unwarranted
attachment in these situations is self-evident and too great to satisfy the requirements of due
process absent any countervailing consideration.” 501 U.S. at 13-14.
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MANDATING USE OF FORM 1 IS A TAKING OF TENANTS’ DEFENSES AND CAUSES OF
ACTION.

Finally, the court rules mandating the use of Form 1 extinguish or seriously degrade
important tenant rights under the FED and the eviction controls legislation, which would give rise
to a different kind of takings violation under the Fifth Amendment than lack of notice. When
court procedures themselves extinguish or degrade a substantive defense or cause of action
belonging to a party, those procedures are subject to challenge under the doctrine enunciated in
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush, and under the three part Matthews/Doehr test.53 As one
commentator said in analyzing what procedures may be necessary to provide adequate notice to
absent members in a class action lawsuit, “a chose in action is a constitutionally protected
property interest. A court, therefore, must provide procedures consistent with due process to
protect that interest.”54
The landlord has a cause of action for breach of contract (the lease), when his tenant
defaults on the rent or otherwise breaches the contract. The D.C. legislature has provided a
statutory framework for enforcing that cause of action in a summary fashion through the FED. At
the same time, in an effort to balance the speed of the proceeding which benefits the landlord
against the need for adequate opportunity for the tenant to contest the claims, the legislature has

52

E.g., Johnson v Berry, 658 A.2d 1051 (1995).

53

Logan v. Zimmerman Brush, 455 U.S. 422, 434 (1982) ; Phillips Petroleum v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985). Steven T.O. Cottreau, Note: the Due Process Right to Opt out of
Class Actions, 73 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 480 (1998).
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provided the tenant certain significant protections within the FED and the eviction controls
legislation, particularly the FED requirement that the summary proceeding be based on a
significantly heightened pleading standard which is arguably the equivalent of summary judgment
procedure, as discussed above. By degrading or severely diluting this statutory protection through
the use of the highly cursory Form 1 complaint, the Superior Court has arguably extinguished or
diluted this important tenant protection, and placed the tenant’s own defenses and counterclaims
against the landlord at substantial risk of erroneous loss. In other words, the court’s mandate of
the use of the Form 1 complaint causes the tenant to lose the protection of knowing the full extent
of the landlord’s claims , especially within the tight time frame provided in the statute. Tenants
have been granted a right under the FED not to have their right to possession terminated in a
summary proceeding except upon the basis of a detailed, verified showing by the landlord through
a person “having knowledge of the facts”. The L&T Rules mandating use of Form 1 contravene
that right in a manner that subjects the tenant’s defenses and counterclaims to an unacceptably
high risk of erroneous deprivation in the ensuing proceeding.55

REFORM OF THE FED AND FORM COMPLAINT
What revisions of Form 1 and of the FED provisions would satisfy these Due Process
concerns?

54

Id, Cottreau, supra, at 512. (Footnotes omitted)

55

In addition to contravening the Logan doctrine, the L&T Rule mandating the use
of Form 1 violates D.C. Code § 11-946, which is commonly interpreted by the D.C. Courts to
forbid the Superior Court from modifying substantive rights through court rules. Matter of
38

First, revision of the form complaint could use notice pleading tailored to individual cases
as found in regular civil cases. While various court and bar committees have wrestled over many
years with trying to come up with a new form complaint or series of form complaints, none have
succeeded. The law is simply too complex: there are approximately eight possible causes of
action for possession authorized under the eviction controls statute. The requirement for the use of
a single form complaint could be abolished in favor of the more standard notice pleading. When
a landlord truly needs immediate relief, the landlord should file a notice pleading complaint and
then file a motion for preliminary relief and for summary judgment.
Second, a significant reform would be to conform L&T practice to the standard practice in
the other parts of the civil division with regard to default judgments. That is, before a judgment
may be entered by default, the landlord should be put to his proof under Rule 64 at an ex parte
hearing. The judge would examine all the facts and law underling a claim before adjudicating the
matter. Some observers might ask, how could the court conduct such an examination on the
40,000 or so default judgments that are currently entered by the L&T Branch? Perhaps the best
response is that many of them are likely cases filed primarily to pressure tenants into paying back
rent. Faced with real procedures that in fact comport with due process, perhaps most of the
40,000 cases would not be filed in the first place. Landlords would have to find other means to
collect back rent. The Superior Court would get out of the business of putting a rubber stamp on
claims about which it has no clue as to the validity of the law and facts upon which they are
based. Due process standards contemplate courts being about the business of adjudicating cases,
not operating eviction mills and collection agencies.

C.A.P., 356 A.2d 335 (D.C. 1976).
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Of course, not every defective complaint presents the court with a Due Process violation
that could be challenged by a lawsuit brought in federal court. D.C. Superior Court, like federal
court, provides defendants, who are fortunate enough to have an attorney, through court rules with
protections against defective and uninformative complaints. As stated, procedures set forth under
SCR Rules 7 through 12 allow a defendant to test the sufficiency of a complaint with a motion
under SCR Rule 12(b)(6), and if the complaint exhibits frivolous allegations, or allegations set
forth for purposes of delay or harassment, or lack any basis in the law, the court may sanction the
party plaintiff and even the party’s attorney under Rule 11. However, not just an individualized
defective complaint is addressed here, but a court-mandated form applied in the context of almost
universally pro se tenants, and in the context of a high percentage of default judgments.
Any Due Process challenge to the Form 1 complaint and its use in the L&T Branch must
address not only the form itself, but the court procedures surrounding its use.
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POINT III.
THE RISK OF ERRONEOUS DEPRIVATION
ARISING FROM SEGREGATING TENANTS’ CLAIMS
FROM LANDLORDS’ CLAIMS
The Supreme Court held in Lindsey v Normet that a “limitation of the litigable” issues in
FED cases complied with the requirements of due process.56 There defendants challenged, inter
alia, the Oregon procedure “... to limit the triable issues in an FED suit to the tenant's default and
to preclude consideration of defenses based on the landlord's breach of a duty to maintain the
premises”. This limitation, defendants contended, denied due process of law because tenants
were being evicted for failing to pay rent for defective premises, when under Oregon law, the rent
that was the basis of the eviction action should have been abated, and because the landlord was
seeking to evict the tenant in retaliation for reporting housing code violations. According to the
defendants, the rental payments should have been suspended while the alleged wrongdoings of
the landlord were litigated. The Court held that it saw “ no constitutional barrier to Oregon's
insistence that the tenant provide for accruing rent pending judicial settlement of his disputes with
the lessor."57 Stated more precisely, the Court held that states such as Oregon were permitted to
provide for tenants to raise a variety of counterclaims and defenses to a landlord’s action for
possession, but that the due process clause did not require the state to permit this in the same
proceeding as the FED.

56

405 U.S. at 66

57

Ibid.
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To reach this conclusion, the Court did not engage in a Doehr form of analysis, but relied
primarily on two much older cases based on a long-standing principle of real property law,
namely, that an action for possession of a piece of property should be resolved prior to
adjudicating a dispute about title to that property.

Grant Timber & Mfg. Co. v. Gray, 236 U.S.

133 (1915)(14th Amendment does not conflict with allowing a suit for possession of land to be
resolved before a claim of title is heard). Bianchi v. Morales, 262 U.S. 170 (1923)(“The United
States, the States, and equally Porto Rico, may exclude all claims of ultimate right from
possessory actions, consistently with due process of law.”). The main reason, apparently, was that
real property law had worked that way for generations, and nothing about due process
commanded a different result. The Court recognized that Oregon law permitted defendants in
FED actions to raise a number of types of counterclaims, but held that there was nothing in due
process doctrine that would require the Court to “federalize” the law of real property by reading
the due process clause to require a state to do so.58
Interestingly, the Court included in its analysis the observation that under American Law
a party should always be permitted to raise whatever defenses it may have.59 The Court found
that real property law had at that time certain characteristics that permitted the landlord to obtain a
prompt determination from a court as to the issue of possession before any other claims or issues

58

“The Constitution has not federalized the substantive law of landlord-tenant
relations, however, and we see nothing to forbid Oregon from treating the undertakings of the
tenant and those of the landlord as independent rather than dependent covenants.” p 20-21.
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"Due process requires that there be an opportunity to present every available
defense." American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 168 (1932). See also Nickey v.
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 393, 396 (1934).” 405 U.S. at 67
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pertaining to title could be raised. The Court ignored the fact that the Oregon defendants were not
raising claims pertaining to title, but were making what at that time were entirely new sorts of
counterclaims, namely, based on breaches of the warranty of habitability.
The dissent sharply criticized the majority’s holding by suggesting a line of analysis that
foreshadows in many ways the Doehr analysis.60
Nearly contemporaneously with Lindsey, the Court issued a number of decisions which
could be read call into the question the majority’s views on due process in that case. The same
Court that rejected the notion in Lindsey, held in a number of contexts that allowing one party
access to court relief before the defending party had access to a hearing on the matter violated due
process. These cases include: D. H. Overmyer Co., Inc., of Ohio et al. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174
(1972) (heavy burden of proof of waiver of due process required before a confession of judgment
could be entered); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)(rejecting writ of replevin of personalty
based merely upon ex parte application; rejecting summary extra-judicial process of pre-judgment
seizure); Lynch v. Household Finance Corp. Et Al.,405 U.S. 538 1972) (questioning prejudgment garnishment procedures); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. Of Bay View, et al., 395
U.S. 337 (1969)(reviewing summary pre-judgment remedies; seizure occurs prior to owner
having any chance to contest). In these decisions, the Court expressed an unwillingness to allow
a party making a claim to gain access to relief from a court without the defendant having a fair
chance to offer a defense to the claim. None of these decisions addressed directly the extent to
which court procedures can segregate plaintiff’s claims from defendant’s counterclaims and
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405 U.S. at 81.
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defenses.
Since the decision in Doehr in 1991, lower courts commonly follow the principle that a
defendant must be permitted to have a fair opportunity to present its side of a dispute over
property before a court may give substantial relief to the plaintiff. Keystone Builders, Inc., v.
Floor Fashions of Virginia, Inc., et al, 829 F. Supp. 181(1993) (reviewing compliance of Virginia
state court pre-judgment attachment procedures with Doehr standard). Pawnbrokers &
Secondhand Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 699 F. Supp. 888 (S.D. Fla. 1988)
(police seizure of property in possession of a pawnbroker without notice and a hearing violated
due process) ; Landers v. Jameson, 2003 Ark. LEXIS 649 (2002)(state pawnbroker statute
violated due process by allowing claimant of pawned item to obtain possession merely upon filing
of an affidavit requesting the item).
Would the “limitation of litigable issues” approved in Lindsey survive due process
scrutiny today? Should the Lindsey holding be read to simply to requiring the tenant to pay or
escrow any rent due the landlord, pending ajudication of the matter?
D.C. courts long ago mitigated this very problem in FED cases by promulgating a court
rule mandating that the court hear tenants’ counterclaims based on breach of the warranty of
habitability together with the landlords’ claims. The governing rules of the D.C. Superior Court
Landlord and Tenant Branch limit the kinds of claims and defenses that a tenant may raise in
response to an FED action, but do allow such counterclaims. Rule 5(b) of the Rules provides:
(b) Counterclaims. In actions in this branch for recovery or possession of property
in which the basis of recovery is nonpayment of rent or in which there is joined a claim for
recovery of rent in arrears, the defendant may assert an equitable defense of recoupment or
set-off or a counterclaim for a money judgment based on the payment of rent or on
expenditures claimed as credits against rent or for equitable relief related to the premises.
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No other counterclaims whether based on personal injury or otherwise, may be filed in this
branch. This exclusion shall be without prejudice to the prosecution of such claims in
other branches of the court.

A fresh review of the status of the law in this area may encourage attorneys representing
tenants to approach decisions about which counterclaims to make with more confidence, knowing
that the due process clause plays a larger role in this area than was countenanced in the Lindsey
decision.61 Judges hearing FED actions may approach adjudication of certain kinds of tenant
counterclaims and defenses with a fresh perspective, if the role of current due process doctrine is
set forth more clearly than it was in Lindsey. Application of the Mathews/Doehr three part test to
the D.C. FED limitation on counterclaims and defenses, indicates that any extreme form of
limitation may cause undue risk of erroneous deprivation of tenant’s property in some situations.
Part one of the four part test: the tenant/defendant’s interest.
Consideration of the first part of the test, "the private interest affected by the [civil
proceeding]", will need to take into account the strong tenant’s interest in continuing legal
possession of her dwelling during the pendency of the FED action and her claims. Because the
dwelling at stake in the proceeding is usually the only home available to the defendant, and most
defendants do not have the financial ability to obtain alternative decent, safe, and sanitary housing
while the claims for both sides are litigated, the tie between the tenants access to her housing and
her ability to litigate her claims is usually extremely close. Hence, court treatment of the
sequencing of its handling of claims and defenses on both sides is of extreme importance to the

61

Generations of tenant defense attorneys in D.C., including the author, have
followed the notion that only a breach of the warranty of habitability by the landlord could be
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tenant.62 In many cases, the tenant’s very ability to litigate effectively is severely compromised
by the loss of her home before her claims are finally determined by the court.
The Lindsey Court passed quickly over the seriousness and finality of the grievous loss
that many low income tenants suffer as a result of an eviction, as the dissent noted. Analysis of
the procedures applied in the L&T Branch should take into account the enormous risk that most
tenants face in litigation that may result in the loss of their homes, particularly low income
tenants63.
Second test: "the risk of erroneous deprivation through the procedures used and the probable
values of additional or alternative safeguards."
As stated, the Lindsey Court held that some segregation of issues in an eviction proceeding
comported with due process.
Are there cases under D.C. law where a court’s refusal to hear, concurrently with
landlord’s claim for possession, certain tenant counterclaims and defenses would raise an
unreasonably high risk of erroneous deprivation of the tenant’s property, in terms of the Doehr
analysis? Several examples suggest how such segregation could cause a problem.
First, under D.C. law, a lease is void ab initio where conditions in the apartment are

raised as a counterclaim by tenants.
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This is not to dispute that there are situations where a well to do tenant may have
two or several dwellings, and where their ability to litigate would not be incommoded by the loss
of possession of the disputed unit.
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See, e.g., Chester Hartman and David Robinson, Evictions: The Hidden Housing
Problem, HOUSING POLICY DEBATE, vol. 14, Issue 4, p. 461. 2003 (Fannie Mae Foundation).
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seriously out of compliance with the housing code at the inception of the tenancy.64 Normally, a
written lease will contain a provision waiving the landlord’s duty to serve the tenant with a notice
to quit terminating the tenancy, which is otherwise a condition precedent to filing an FED action.
If the lease be void, the waiver of the notice is void, and the landlord’s action for possession
would be dismissed, since landlords rely on the waiver before filing an FED action, rather than
sending the tenant a notice to quit. For a court to refuse to hear the tenant’s claims that a lease is
void ab initio would raise a very serious risk that the court would erroneously deprive the tenant
of possession. The landlord under D.C. law in this situation has no claim for possession, and yet
the court would be entering judgment on such a claim by refusing to entertain the tenant’s
counterclaim. Rule 5(b) prevents the court from entertaining this error because it allows the
tenant to raise the counterclaim, and the requirement of due process is satisfied.
Second, if the landlord’s claim for possession were based on tenant’s failure to pay rent,
and the tenant could show under D.C. law that serious housing code violations in the unit were
sufficient to abate all of the rent due, the court would be entering judgment erroneously by failing
to entertain the tenant’s housing code defense.65 Again, Rule 5(b) prevents this error.
These situations highlight the potential for erroneous deprivation of a tenancy, and L&T
Rule 5(b) may be said to satisfy the due process standard by requiring the court to entertain the
tenant’s warranty counterclaims and defenses in both cases. Should the court ever consider
revising L&T Rule 5 (b), its due process underpinnings would have to be carefully considered.
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Brown v. Southall Realty, supra.
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Javins v. First National Realty, 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 14 D.C. Mun.
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However, Rule 5 (b) does not allow the court to entertain many sorts of counterclaims.
As a third example, suppose that a private, absentee landlord managed his property for
several years through a hired management company, but then terminated that company, and failed
for a year to hire a new management company. However, a dishonest onsite property manager
continued to occupy his office in the building and to collect the rent from the tenants who did not
learn of the termination of the management company. After the year, the landlord hired a new
management company, and sued the tenants for the year of back rent which the landlord had not
collected. The tenants might claim that they had paid all the rent due, but had been duped into
paying it to the dishonest former property manager. The tenants would want not only to claim
that they had paid all rent due and owing, but also to join their claim for moneys paid to the
property manager in the action for possession, and bring in the dishonest former manager as a
third party defendant to the action. They would want to ask the court to order him to pay over the
rent he had wrongfully collected to the landlord. However, the L&T Rules do not permit third
party joinder under Superior Court Rule 14. L&T Rule 2. A plain reading of Rule 5(b) would
prohibit the tenants from filing a cross claim against the dishonest manager, much less
counterclaim against the landlord. The tenants could file an independent action against the
property manager and then move to join the landlord’s action for possession and the action
against the property manager. The author suspects that most L&T judges would allow these suits
to be joined or heard jointly, but failure to allow joinder would raise a serious risk of erroneous

Regs § 301.1.
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deprivation of the tenancies, and hence due process concerns.66 In light of this example, Rule
5(b) does not avert all due process concerns for the court on this point.
A fourth example further highlights the due process implications of limiting counterclaims
and defenses in FED actions. Suppose a pattern and practice fair housing case, where a landlord
has raised the rent, without violating any rent control standards, for the African- American tenants
in a building, while raising rents by much lesser amounts for white residents. An African
American tenant makes two payments and then fails to continue pay the full amount of the
increased rent and is sued for possession based on non-payment of rent. The tenant/defendant
seeks to counterclaim based on violations of the federal Fair Housing Act and the D.C. Human
Rights Act.67 The counterclaims might be for injunctive relief against the rent increases and for
actual and punitive damages against the landlord and his property manager.68 L&T Rule 5(b) on
its face would seem to prohibit the filing of such counterclaims. However, for the court not to
permit these counterclaims to be heard at the same time as the landlord’s claim for possession
would give rise to a serious risk of erroneous deprivation of the tenancy, since the tenant could
easily be evicted prior to obtaining relief on her fair housing claims, if they were filed and tried
separately. Again, I suspect that most judges in the court would permit the counterclaim to be
heard, or consolidate or join the cases.
In fact, in Douglas v. Kriegsfeld Corporation, 849 A.2d 951 (D.C. May 13., 2004),
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See, e.g., Shin v Portals Confederation Corporation, 728 A.2d 615 (D.C. 1999)
(tenant may raise as a defense any matter going to the merits of the landlord’s claim).
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42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. D.C. Code § 2-1401.01 et seq.
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vacated, 2004 D.C. App. LEXIS 420 (August 6, 2004). the D.C. Court of Appeals, in a panel
decision which was later vacated, ruled in favor of a tenant with a mental disability raising a
claim against the landlord for a reasonable accommodation based on her disability under the
federal Fair Housing Act. The vacated panel decision simply made no reference to L&T Rule
5(b). Perhaps the court recognized, impliedly, that the federal Fair Housing statute pre-empted
the local Rule 5(b), and that the tenant was requesting “equitable relief related to the premises.”
Significantly, the tenant had vacated the premises prior to the Court of Appeals making its
decision and prior to the Fair Housing Act claim adjudication.
The D.C. courts have effectively narrowed the applicability of Rule 5(b) in a series of
cases allowing counterclaims and defenses that, while closely involved with the landlord’s main
claim, on their face would seem to be barred literally by the Rule. Henry B.Y. Shin, v. Portals
Confederation Corporation, et al., 728 A.2d 615 (D.C. 1999)(fraud counterclaim voluntarily
dismissed in L&T Court was held in a later action to be barred by res judicata)(strenuous dissent
by Ruiz, J.). Barton v D.C., 817 A.2d 834 (D.C. 2003) (defense of racial discrimination by
landlord held cognizable in L&T Court notwithstanding Rule 5(b), since any defense of general
denial of liability is cognizable). Williams v. Dudley Trust Found., 675 A.2d 45 (D.C.1996)
(Judge sitting in L&T Branch had authority to hear L&T and related matters in context of action
for possession based on failure to pay on real estate purchase contract. This case might be viewed
as simply two consolidated cases, one an FED action, being heard together.). 69
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42 U.S.C. § 3613(c).
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Cf., Partmar Corporation et al. v. Paramount Pictures Theatres Corp., et al., 347
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On the other hand, Rule 5(b) has been applied robustly to disallow the filing of several
types of counterclaims by tenants. Millman Broder & Curtis v. D. F. Antonelli, Jr., et al.,489
A.2d 481 (D.C. 1985)( applying Rule 5(b) to a general tort damages counterclaim). Frank
Mathis, Jr. v. Ulysses Barrett, 544 A.2d 287, (D.C. 1988) (applying Rule 5(b) to prohibit filing a
counterclaim in tort that went beyond housing code violations). Miles Realty Co. v. Garrett, 292
A.2d 152, 153 (D.C. 1972) (remand to trial court for dismissal without prejudice of counterclaim
for damages to personalty as improperly filed in Landlord and Tenant Branch). Weisman v.
Middleton, 390 A.2d 996, 1001 (D.C. 1978) (counterclaim for malicious prosecution would not
be permitted under Rule 5(b) in a second eviction action giving rise to a claim for malicious
prosecution). Winchester Management Corp. v. Staten, 361 A.2d 187 (D.C. 1976)(equitable
defense of set-offs based on housing conditions not covered by the Housing Code not permitted
since they did not go to the validity of the lease).
These cases are difficult to reconcile with each other, and the underlying issue remains,
whether Rule 5(b) is adequately drafted to guide the court’s decision making so as to maintain
compliance with due process requirements. In other words, the D.C. courts have not yet
developed a coherent doctrine on handling limitations on issues in FED actions in light of the
“erroneous deprivation standard” set forth in Doehr.70

U.S. 89, (1954) (movie theaters counterclaims under anti-trust legislation).
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As noted, D.C. courts have applied Rule 5(b) to allow some significant categories
of counterclaims, offsets, and defenses to be raised against the landlord’s claims in an FED
action, and hence the timing of access problem is obviated. These categories include: adequacy
of service of process; the warranty of habitability; a defendant’s challenge to the plaintiff’s title to
the property (a “plea of title” sends the case to another branch of the court); other challenges to
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Rule 5(b)’s compliance with Due Process might best be preserved by the court permitting
tenants to raise any defense, counterclaim, case consolidation, third party claim, or stay of an
eviction action in situations where the tenant can show that a hearing on the landlord’s claims in
advance of a hearing on the tenant’s claims will seriously prejudice the tenant’s interests in
possession. Entertaining such motions would be a mechanism for satisfying the second aspect of
this second part of the four part Doehr test.
At some point, de-coupling tenant’s defenses and counterclaims from the landlord’s
claims amounts to a pre-judgment attachment of the tenant’s property. Courts may not be able
easily to derive a bright line test for when such a pre-judgment attachment will occur, but there
may be cases that cross that line, and a modified procedure for the court’s entertaining such tenant
motions would forestall the court from crossing that line.
There are extremely serious interests on both sides in L&T cases. The de-coupling of
tenant’s defenses and counterclaims from landlord’s main claims in the context of this complexity
of the law and the facts can give rise to a very high risk of erroneous deprivation in the absence of
procedures to sort out the issues fairly.

the landlord's standing to bring the action -- within certain limits; actual payment of the rent
claimed as due and owing; tenant challenges to the truth of the landlord's notice claim, e.g.,
repeated late payment of rent by the tenant; and, the legality of rent increases. In addition, the
eviction action may be stayed pending action by the D.C. Rental Accommodation Office
determination of whether the rent charge complies with the D.C. rent control regime. Drayton v
Poretsky Mgt., 462 A.2d 1115 (D.C. 1983).
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CONCLUSION
The FED process, in D.C. at least, may not withstand due process scrutiny because the
Form 1 complaint fails to provide minimally adequate notice to defendants and allows landlords
to obtain a judgment without the factual showing required by the FED statute and Due Process.
Reform is needed to preserve due process, and provide better notice to tenants, while providing
landlords with some modicum of speed in the fair adjudication of their claims.
Reform to the complaint procedures of L&T court and to the procedures preventing
tenants to file uncurtailed claims and defenses are clearly not a solution to all the problems
identified by Chester Hartman in his study of evictions, or to all the issues raised in Prof.
Spector's analysis of the evolution of L&T law. Tenants will still be evicted unfairly at times and
face a world of homelessness. But the court will be forced to operate more fairly if plaintiffs must
state their cases more clearly and accurately in the initial complaint. Some tenants will have a
better understanding of what to do when they come to court, and perhaps be able to respond more
intelligently to claims raised in the complaints. The Court will be less inclined to enter judgments
by default where the face of the complaint shows no basis for doing so.
The intellectual underpinnings of Lindsey v. Normet have attenuated. Perhaps, as Prof.
Spector and others have suggested, it is time to lay it to rest. There exist substantial legal bases
for doing so.
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ATTACHMENT 1.
SUPERIOR COURT RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR THE LANDLORD AND TENANT
BRANCH
D.C. SCR-LT Appx., Form 1 (2003)
Form 1. Complaint for possession of real estate
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIVIL DIVISION, LANDLORD AND TENANT BRANCH
500 Indiana Avenue, Northwest
John Marshall Level, Room JM-255
Washington, D.C. 20001 Telephone 879-1152
L&T ..........
.................

vs. .........................

Plaintiff/Landlord
.................

Defendant/Tenant
.............................

Address

Address

.................
Zip Code

Washington, D.C.
Zip Code

COMPLAINT FOR POSSESSION OF REAL ESTATE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ss:
................. being first duly sworn, states: ( ) he or she is the landlord and/or ( ) licensed real
estate broker or ( ) the landlord's authorized agent of the house, apartment or office located at
........................., Washington, D.C.
The property is in the possession of the defendant, who holds it without right.
The landlord seeks possession of the property because:
A. ( ) The tenant failed to pay: $ ....., total rent due from ..... to .....; $ ....., late fees; and/or $
....., other fees (Specify) ...........
The monthly rent is $ ..... The total amount due to the landlord is $ ......
Notice to quit has been: ( ) served as required by law ( ) waived in writing.
B. ( ) Tenant failed to vacate property after notice to quit expired. (copy attached).
C. ( ) For the following reason: (explain fully). ...................
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....................................................................
Notice to quit is: ( ) not required ( ) waived in writing ( ) other ...
Therefore, the landlord asks the Court for:
( ) judgment for possession of the property described.
( ) judgment for rent, late fees, other fees and costs in the amount of $ ......
( ) an order of the Court that all future rent be paid into the Registry of the Court until the case
is decided.
Subscribed before me this ...... day of .........., 20...
.........................
Plaintiff/Landlord or Agent
.............
Notary Public

.............
My Commission expires:

SUMMONS -- TO APPEAR IN COURT
YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED AND REQUIRED TO APPEAR ON ......, 19.. AT 9:00
A.M. PROMPTLY, in Landlord and Tenant Court, Courtroom JM-16, 500 Indiana Avenue, N.W.
(John Marshall Level) to answer your landlord's compliant for possession of the premises listed in
the above complaint. If you live on the premises and you are not named as a tenant you must
come to court if you claim a right to possession of the premises.
CONVOCATORIA -- DE COMPARENCIA AL TRIBUNAL
A USTED SE LE ORDENA Y EXIGE QUE COMPAREZCA EL ......, 19.. A LAS 9:00 A.M.
al Tribunal de Arrendadores y Arrendatarios, Sala JM-16, Avenida Indiana #500, Noroeste (piso
John Marshall) a contestar la demanda entablada por ocupacion de la propiedad aqui citada. Si
usted vive en esa propiedad sin que se le mencione como inquilino, debe presentarse al Tribunal
para reclamar cualquier derecho de ocupacion que tenga sobre la misma.
.................
Plaintiff's/Landlord's Attorney
Abogado del demandante/Arrendador CLERK OF THE COURT
SECRETARIO DEL TRIBUNAL
.................

Costs of this suit to date are

Address/Direction Zip Code/Codigo postal Costos del jucio hasta la fecha
.................
Phone No. Unified Bar No.
Telefono
No. de afiliacion
Sociedad de Abogados
....................................................................
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Date

Court Clerk's Memorandum
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Judge Clerk's Initials

